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REPLY TO POINT II OF 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
The gist of respondents' argument respecting 
Items 9, 11, 13, 17, 20, 22 and 29 appears to be two-
fold, i.e. ( 1) that such items are fixtures because 
of their annexation and adaptation to the realty or 
(2) that such items are fixtures, not by actual an-
nexation to the realty but by constructive annexa-
tion. 
As to ( 1) above, that matter has already been 
covered in Appellant's Brief and nothing more need 
1 
be said here. As to ( 2) above, we recognize that the 
doctrine of constructive annexation has been applied 
in other jurisdictions in specific condemnation ac-
tions as shown by the cases cited in Respond en ts' 
Brief, and it appears that such is the majority rule. 
109 A.L.R. 1424. However, we can find no Utah 
condemnation case where it has been applied in this 
State. The question becomes one of whether con-
structive annexation should apply in Utah and, if 
so, to what extent. 
There is a wide spectrum between items such 
as movable hand tools and equipment on the one 
hand and immovable machinery on the other, all of 
which could under appropriate circumstances be 
considered as integrated into a synchronized system 
necessary to function as a unit. And within the ex-
tremes there are and will be border-line cases of 
items where the degree of annexation and the extent 
of integration into the system varies and gives the 
items the dual aspects of personalty and fixtures 
constructively annexed. Likewise the problem be-
comes even more perplexing where, as here, parts 
of the items themselves are readily movable and in 
fact were removed from the property taken. The 
more difficult question becomes one of where do we 
draw the line? 
The application of the doctrine of constructive 
annexation urged by respondents would make fix-
tures of all items between the above extremes and 
would create a "carte blanche" for the landowner 
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to receive compensation for items of personal prop-
erty which, although an integral part of the opera-
tion conducted on the real property, could be removed 
without damage to the item or to the real property. 
Yet it is settled law in this jurisdiction that Sectimi 
7 8-3 4-1 0 ( 1) does not allow com pens a ti on for per-
sonal property situated upon the real property 
taken. Utah Road Commission v. Hansen, 14 Utah 
(2d) 305, 383 Pac. (2d) 917 ( 1963). Likewise in 
those jurisdictions, such as Utah, which allow no 
recovery for the cost of removing personal property 
the1·e is no liability for machinery or other fixtures 
attached only by screws or which can otherwise be 
readily removed. Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol-
ume 2, Section 5.83 p. 328. And it has lileen held that 
such items as tools, equipment and raw materials 
and supplies which were not annexed to the real pro-
perty were not fixtures, even though such items were 
of little value for use elsewhere. People v. Johnsmi 
& Co., 219 N.Y.S. 741 (1927), affirmed 157 N.E. 
885 (New York, 1927). In the case of City of Los 
Angeles v. Siegel, 41 Cal. Rptr. 563, 230 Cal. App. 
(2d) 980 (Calif., 1964) the California court re-
fused to apply the doctrine of constructive annexa-
tion and affirmed a lower court holding that certain 
items were not fixtures merely because they were 
essential and integral to the business conducted on 
the real property and when separated from the op-
eration were rendered second-hand and greatly re-
duced in value. 
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And so, we urge that the better test still is whe-
ther the mode of annexation is such that removal of 
the item will cause substantial damage to the item 
itself and to the realty to which it is attached. Here 
the trial court found in effect that the items re-
moved could be removed without substantial dam-
age to the item itself or to the building to which it 
was attached (R. 41, 72). That being so, the trial 
court erred in awarding defendants judgment for 
any amount as to any of those items so removed by 
defendants. 
REPLY TO POINT III OF 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Point III of Respondents' Brief is devoted to a 
cross appeal from the judgment of the trial court 
disallowing any severance damage for those items 
set forth in Exhibit "D" (R. 58, 59) located on the 
remainder of defendants' property not taken. The 
trial court found that all of such items were fix-
tures ( R. 73, 7 4) but 
"9. That any damage to the items de-
scribed in Finding No. 6 hereinabove result-
ing from the condemnation of that portion of 
defendants' premises taken by plaintiff here-
in is so indefinite and speculative as to the 
nature, extent and amount thereof, if any, 
that the court finds no damage to any and all 
of said i terns." ( R. 7 4) 
The trial court then concluded 
"4. That the law does not specifically 
provide for compensation for damages to fix-
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tures not taken in condemnation, and in any 
event defendants are not entitled to any com-
pensation for damages to the fixtures describ-
ed in Finding Of Fact No. 6 herein because 
such damages, if any, are so indefinite and 
speculative as to the nature, extent and 
amount thereof that the court concludes that 
no damages should be allowed or awarded to 
defendants therefor." (R. 75) 
Thus, the issue on this appeal boils down to ( 1) 
whether severance damages to fixtures are com-
pensable in Utah and ( 2) whether there is any rea-
sonable basis, either because of lack of evidence or 
from the evidence and the fair inferences derived 
therefrom, to sustain the refusal of the trial court 
to award any severance damages to the fixtures not 
taken. 
As to ( 1) above, we note that the nature and 
extent of compensation allowed in eminent domain 
proceedings is purely statutory and if not expressly 
allowed by statute it is non-compensable since this 
court has held that Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitittion is not self executing and applies only to 
the extent that the enabling legislation carries it. 
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah (2d) 417, 
354 Pac. (2d) 105 (1960). And so we must look to 
Section 78-34-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which 
limits compensation to those elements expressly en-
umerated therein. 
" ( 1) The value of the property sought 
to be condemned and all improvements there-
on appertaining to the realty, and of each and 
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every separate estate or interest therein; and 
if it consists of different parcels, the value 
of each parcel and of each estate or interest 
therein shall be separately assessed. 
" ( 2) If the property sought to be con-
demned constitutes only a part of a larger 
parcel, the damages which will accrue to the 
portion not sought to be condemned by reason 
of its severance from the portion sought to be 
condemned and the construction of the im-
provement in the manner proposed by the 
plaintiff." 
We note that subsection ( 1) speaks in terms of 
property and improvements thereon appertaining 
to the realty as being compensable. Thus for fix-
tures to be compensable as a part of the "take" 
such must be encompassed in the description of "im-
provements thereon appertaining to the realty." 
However, subsection (2) omits any reference to im-
provements and, of course, does not mention fix-
tures. It speaks only in terms of damages accruing 
to the portion of the property not sought to be 
condemned resulting from the partial taking. 
In spite of the above, damages to improvements 
on the remaining lands not taken have been held to 
be compensable. State v. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 
Pac. ( 2d) 113 ( 1948). Yet in State Road Commis-
sion v. Hansen, 14 Utah (2d) 305, 383 Pac. (2d) 
917 ( 1963) this court noted that the statute speaks 
in terms of real property and contains no express 
wording construable as allowing recovery for per-
sonal property. The rationale of the case construes 
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the statute as limiting compensation to those inter-
ests expressly provided for therein. Thus, section 
78-34-10(2), Utah Code Annotated 1953 omits all 
reference to improvements, and this we believe is 
what the trial court had in mind in reaching its con-
clusion that the law does not specifically provide for 
compensation for damages to fixtures not taken in 
condemnation. Accordingly, we ask this court for a 
clarification thereof. 
As to ( 2) above, the trial court found and con-
cluded that any damages to the remaining fixtures 
not taken were so indefinite and speculative as to 
the nature, extent and amount thereof, if any, that 
there was no damage ( R. 7 4) and none should be 
awarded (R. 75). The issue then on this appeal is 
whether there is any reasonable basis, either be-
cause of lack of evidence or from the evidence and 
the fair inferences derived therefrom taken in the 
light most favorable to plaintiff, to sustain the re-
fusal of the trial court to award any severance dam-
ages to the fixtures not taken. Ray v. Consolidated 
Freightways, 4 Utah (2d) 137, 289 Pac. (2d) 196 
( 1955). Defendants seem to make much of the fact 
that plaintiff did not offer conflicting evidence to 
dispute the claimed severance damages to the fix-
tures itemized on Exhibit "D" (R. 58, 59). The 
answer to that is that it was defendants' burden to 
prove not only that such fixtures had been damaged 
but the amount thereof, and plaintiff, being satis-
fied that such burden had not been met, chose not 
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to offer any evidence thereon. Thus, the fact that 
the plaintiff did not come forth with conflicting 
evidence is of no help to the defendants when they 
failed to establish in the mind of the fact trier a 
prim a f acie case on severance damages. 
In the cases of Malstrom, v. Consolidated Thea-
tres, 4 Utah (2d) 181, 290 Pac. (2d) 689 (1955) 
and Ray v. Consolidated Freightways, 4 Utah (2d) 
137, 289 Pac. 196 ( 1955) this court held that the 
ref us al of the trial court to find as one party re-
quests does not have to be supported by substantial 
evidence, but on the contrary such refusal to so find 
can be based upon a lack of evidence. In the Ray 
case, supra, it was noted on page 144 of the Utah 
Reports that: 
"It would only be when such refusal did 
such violence to common sense as to convince 
the court that no fact trier, acting fairly and 
reasonably, would refuse to make such find-
ing, that it would be reversed." 
And in the Malstrorn case, supra, it was pointed out 
on page 185 of the Utah Reports that the only cir-
cumstance under which this court would be war-
ranted in overturning the trial court's determina-
tion would be if the evidence were such that no rea-
sonable person could remain unconvinced of the 
establishment of that determinative fact. 
As to Items 32 to 41, inclusive, itemized on Ex-
hibit "D" (R. 58, 59), defendants were put to their 
proof that such items had been damaged and the 
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extent thereof (Tr. 3). The measure of damage, if 
any, would be the difference in the fair market 
value before and after the taking (Stipulation, par. 
4(2), R. 63). As to Items 34, 37, 39 and 40 plain-
tiff agreed on the cost of relocation if the court de-
termined such were fixtures and had been damaged 
(Tr. 3, 4, 5), but plaintiff did not agree that such 
was the amount of severance damage as stated on 
page 22 of Respondents' Brief. 
Thus, defendants had the burden of proving 
that the remaining fixtures had been damaged to a 
reasonably ascertainable extent and in a manner 
compensable by law. Defendants failed in both re-
spects, and the trial court so found. 
In Nichols On Eminent Domain, Volume 4, Sec-
tion 14.21 (2), page 51.9, the general rule is stated 
as follows: 
"The burden of proof is upon the owner 
to show that the taking of part of his property 
will cause damage to the remainder, and un-
less he shows such damage by affirmative 
evidence, furnishing a basis from which a 
reasonable and proper estimate of the amount 
thereof can be made, his compensation will 
be limited to the value of the land taken .... " 
And in 27 Am. Jur. (2d), Section 310, it is stat-
ed on page 126: 
"The injury to the remaining land must 
be sufficiently definite to be of practical im-
portance, and to enter into the present market 
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value; if it is remote and speculative, it can-
not be considered. . . " 
It was incumbent upon defendants to prove the 
fair market value of each item before and after the 
taking (R. 63, Tr. 3), first to prove that such items 
had in fact been damaged and second to prove the 
amount thereof. Plaintiff agreed to the reasonable 
cost of relocation of Items 34, 37, 39 and 40 which 
the court could consider if it found that those items 
had been damaged (Tr. 3, 4). A cursory examin-
ation of the Record shows that the trial court was 
justified in finding that the defendants had failed 
in sustaining their burden. 
The most obvious defect is that Items 34, 37, 
39 and 40 were not given a fair market value by any 
of the defendants' witnesses. The defendants merely 
submitted the cost of relocation of each item as 
stipulated to by the parties. As to those items, the 
only evidence to establish their market value was 
the cost of relocation, which was insufficient to 
sustain defendants' burden on those items. In the 
case of City of La Mesa v. Tweed And Gambrell 
Planing Mill, 304 Pac. (2d) 803 (Calif. 1956) the 
California court, in considering testimony as to the 
cost of relocation of certain machinery and electric 
and blower systems for a part of the landowner's 
planing mill not included in the "take", stated on 
page 812 of the Pacific Reporter: 
"The cost of removing or relocating such 
equipment is not reasonably related to its 
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value as part of the premises involved. Such 
a cost is not a compensable item recoverable 
as part of the award for land taken on ac-
count of severance damage." 
And in the Utah case of State v. Ward, 112 
Utah 452, 189 Pac. (2d) 113 (1948) this court, in 
discussing the approach to be used in ascertaining 
severance damages under subsection ( 2) of Section 
78-34-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, noted that the 
replacement or restoration cost in lieu of damages 
should not be applied to subsection ( 2), but rather 
that the correct measure of damages was embodied 
in the Instruction of the lower court set forth on 
page 116 of the Pacific Reporter as follows: 
" ... That uncertain, remote, speculative 
or imaginary elements of damage should not 
be considered, but only elements which are 
appreciable and substantial and actually les-
sen the market value, and that the damages 
to remaining property must be limited to the 
difference in market value before and after 
condernna ti on.'' 
This court then cited with approval the case of Coos 
Bay Logging Company v. Barclay, 159 Oregon 272, 
70 Pac. (2d) 672, 679 with reference to the cost of 
moving a house back and away from the expanded 
right-of-way as being too remote as a basis for com-
pensation. And so, under the authorities, it is clear 
that as to the items enumerated above defendants 
failed to prove that such items had been damaged 
by the diminution in the fair market value thereof 
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and, accordingly, the trial court properly refused 
to award any severance damage therefor. 
As to the remaining items, the Record falls far 
short of the requirement that no reasonable fact 
finder could remain unconvinced that defendants 
had proved the diminution of market value of each 
particular item as the result of the "take". In at-
tempting to establish severance damage the land-
owner must show more than the value of the proper-
ty to him, since we are dealing with a situation 
where the property has not been taken nor has it 
suffered any physical injury. In the case of C01n-
monwealth v. Stamper, 345 S.W. (2d) 640 (Ken-
tucky) the court laid down what we believe to be the 
desirable rule: That the evidence of factors bearing 
upon diminution of value should be addressed to 
how they will affect market value and not how they 
will hurt the owner or make less advantageous the 
use of the property for his particular purposes or 
to correct conditions which he would like to remedy. 
An examination of the transcript in this case 
shows that defendants' expert witness Glassey read-
ily gave opinions as to the before and after values 
of the items in question, but failed to set forth the 
factors which entered into such opinions. Likewise, 
his estimates of the before values were based upon 
the cost of construction less an assumed accrued de-
preciation to March 22, 1963. Yet he was uncertain 
as to when the items had been constructed or how 
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long they had been in place. He put a before value 
on Item 32 of $900.00 (Tr. 71) yet defendants val-
ued it at $800.00 (R. 58). He consistently used a 
flat depreciation of 25 % , repeatedly stating that 
the life of the item had been about one fourth used, 
without further explanation. He put an after value 
of $400.00 on the monorail and hoist (Item 41) 
without knowing whether it was still operable or 
not. Yet he admitted that such fact would be impor-
tant in its resale value (Tr. 84). And he was un-
certain as to whether it was power operated (Tr. 
83, 85). This was typical of his whole testimony, 
and the trial court obviously had grave doubts as to 
the credibility thereof. And it must be remembered 
that the trial court viewed the premises and saw for 
itself the remaining items in question (Tr. 139, 
140). 
The Record indicates a dearth of facts under-
pinning the opinions of value give by Mr. Glassey, 
although he did state that some of the items were 
custom-made and could not readily be purchased on 
the open market. However, the defendants failed to 
show whether or not these items could have been 
used had they so wished to make use of them. The 
testimony of Mr. Glassey seems to be based upon 
the presumption that the items in question were 
completely worthless to the defendants and could 
not have been put to use even with an additional ex-
penditure of money on the portion not taken. In at-
tempting to establish the fair market value after 
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the taking, the mere fact that an expert states as his 
opinion that the items have no value is not binding 
upon the finder of fact who in his discretion may 
weigh such testimony in light of the factors upon 
which such opinion is based, his view of the prem-
ises, the qualifications and interest of the witness 
and the general reliability of such testimony. 
On the basis of the evidence submitted, the trial 
court concluded that defendants had failed to prove 
severance damages to the remaining fixtures by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Likewise, it conclud-
ed from the evidence that such damages, if any, 
were too indefinite and speculative. The Record falls 
far short of the requirement that the trial court's 
refusal to find severance damages would do such 
violence to common sense so as to convince this court 
that no fact trier acting fairly and reasonably would 
refuse to make such finding. That being so, under 
the time honored rule the finding of the trial court 
cannot be disturbed. Ray v. Consolidated Freight-
ways, 4 Utah (2d) 137, 289 Pac. (2d) 196 ( 1955). 
We respectfully submit that the judgment of 
the trial court in its refusal to award severance 
damages to the remaining fixtures not taken should 
be affirmed. And for the reasons hereinabove stated 
and those set forth in Appellant's Brief we respect-
14 
fully submit that the judgment of the trial court 
must be modified to reduce the amount of the award 
by the sum of $2,542.00, being the net amount 
awarded to defendants for the seven items about 
which plaintiff complains. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
JOSEPH NOV AK 
Special Assistant 
Attorney General 
520 Continental Bank Bldg. 
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